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Heritable, human genome editing 
constitutes one of the most conten-
tious issues facing science policy. This 
was starkly illustrated by Dr. He’s 
unsafe, unethical, and irresponsible 
editing of twin girls’ embryos in an 
attempt to confer HIV immunity. The 
hubris of those experiments stands in 
contrast to calls for a regulated path-
way from the U.S.’s National Acade-
mies and the U.K.’s Nuffield Council.1 
But in all of the public discussion of 
the topic, the focus has been on edit-
ing embryos. What about editing 
sperm or eggs?
Weighed down by technical, statu-
tory, as well as sectarian challenges, 
the prospect of editing a human 
embryo’s genome at fertilization still 
remains a long-term goal. Mindful 
of this reality, the 2015 International 
Summit on Human Gene Editing 
reported the editing of mouse sper-
matogonial stem cells followed by 
testicular transplantation, resulting 
in the repair of a cataract-causing 
mutation.2 Further experimen-
tal work in this area, however, has 
proven limited. Similarly limited 
efforts have characterized editing 
eggs, although the editing of gametes 
is likely to flourish as the prospect of 
stem cell-derived gametes becomes 
reality. This outcome is bound to shift 
the focus from genome editing the 
embryo to its antecedent gametes. 
This will likely increase control of the 
genome editing process, including 
eliminating problems of embryonic 
mosaicism. In this paper we discuss 
how the editing of sperm and eggs 
differs from embryos from a bioethi-
cal and U.S. legal perspective.
Ethical Differences
Some of the ethical concerns raised 
about editing embryos are appli-
cable to editing sperm and eggs; 
others are not. Objections to embry-
onic gene editing due to the need to 
destroy human embryos in research 
and clinical applications — a policy 
embedded into U.S. law through the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment — are 
quite different for sperm and eggs. 
Those who have opposed the destruc-
tion of embryos, including members 
of some religious communities have 
not raised similar objections as to 
sperm and eggs. Proponents of per-
sonhood claims emphasize that “the 
genetic code of the early embryo is 
set at the time when sperm and egg 
form a zygote.”3 But sperm and egg-
editing occurs before that moment, 
upending the claim that editing alters 
“a person.” The activity is more like 
selecting a sperm or an egg donor.
For those who are concerned with 
departing from “Nature,” or harbor 
fears over “playing G-d,” perhaps edit-
ing even at this early stage is prob-
lematic. That said, such concerns 
might be managed by imposing the 
restriction endorsed by the National 
Academies that editing should cur-
rently be limited “to converting such 
genes to versions that are prevalent 
in the population and are known to 
be associated with ordinary health 
with little or no evidence of adverse 
effects.”4
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That recommendation and others 
for a regulated pathway might also 
somewhat allay safety concerns, a 
set of concerns applicable to editing 
embryos, sperm, and eggs.
Legal Differences
The main statute that prohibits the 
clinical use of heritable genome edit-
ing is a Congressional appropriations 
rider, first put into law in 2015 and 
annually renewed. The rider, provides
None of the funds made avail-
able by this Act may be used to 
notify a sponsor or otherwise 
acknowledge receipt of a sub-
mission for an exemption for 
investigational use of a drug or 
biological product under [the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act or the Public Health 
Service Act] in research in 
which a human embryo is inten-
tionally created or modified 
to include a heritable genetic 
modification5
The rider was initially — and 
surreptitiously — entered into the 
appropriations bill with little discus-
sion. This past year, the language was 
briefly removed, prompting a brief 
debate about whether it applied to 
mitochondrial replacement therapies 
and ought to be re-inserted. But the 
debate firmly centered on the editing 
of embryos. No legislator has consid-
ered whether the language applies to 
the editing of sperm and eggs.
There are strong arguments to be 
made that the plain text of the rider 
does not apply to sperm and eggs. 
The rider is narrowly drawn, prohib-
iting only the government funding of 
the FDA to engage in two, specific, 
and bureaucratic activities: notify-
ing applicants regarding exemption 
requests to the agency’s IND require-
ments; or acknowledging the receipt 
of any such requests. These prohibi-
tions apply only “in research” with one 
of two results: either where a “human 
embryo is intentionally created” or 
research where “a human embryo 
is modified to include a heritable 
genetic modification.” In either case, 
the object of the research in the text 
is a “human embryo,” not its anteced-
ent gametes. Further, the language of 
the rider couches its prohibitions in 
terms of specific results: those where 
a human embryo has been either cre-
ated or modified — notable uses of 
the past participle.
By its own terms, the rider does 
not therefore apply to cases where 
embryos are not created, such as the 
mere editing of eggs or sperm without 
a subsequent act of fertilization. Such 
an activity neither works on the object 
of the rider — the human embryo — 
nor fulfills its result. And even in cases 
where edited eggs or sperm are even-
tually used to create an embryo, it can 
hardly be said that the embryo has 
been modified. The embryo, in such 
a case, contains the genetic makeup 
it happens to contain — again, like 
choosing a sperm or egg donor. The 
act of fertilization does not modify an 
embryo. Furthermore, any exemption 
would be filed — that is, when lawyers 
deliver papers to FDA — concurrently 
with the editing of the target gametes, 
before any embryos would have been 
yet created, let alone modified. And 
indeed, if such gametes do not end 
up being used in fertilization, they 
can hardly be said to have “created” or 
“modified” any embryos at all.
This plain-text reading aside, one 
hypothetical further presses the odd-
ness of reading the rider as applying 
to editing sperm or eggs, pre-fertil-
ization: Imagine an individual, the 
product of genome-editing, possesses 
a heritable, edited trait and seeks 
to reproduce. If the rider applies to 
using edited sperm or eggs to produce 
an embryo, it would seem to suggest 
that their reproductive act falls under 
the rider — and that they ought to 
seek an IND from FDA, which the 
agency must deny acknowledging. It 
seems unlikely this is what Congress 
intended.
If the language is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; Congress’ intent — 
even if contrary to the text — takes a 
backseat. If, by contrast, the language 
of the rider is ambiguous, then ordi-
narily, courts defer to an agency’s rea-
sonable interpretation of a provision. 
So could the FDA clear up the ambi-
guity on its own? It is unlikely. That 
deference is only owed when Con-
gress delegates authority to an agency 
to make rules “carrying the force of 
law” — and some judges have sug-
gested this may not apply to appro-
priations riders, including in a similar 
case pertaining to the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment.6
Conclusion
If the appropriations rider does not 
apply to editing sperm and eggs, then 
If the appropriations rider does not to apply to 
editing sperm and eggs, then the next step will 
depend on the bioethical distinctions drawn 
above. For those who believe that editing sperm 
and eggs is just as problematic as embryos,  
they should seek to alter the rider to make it 
apply to sperm and egg-editing as well.  
For those who think that there are important 
differences, this may open an opportunity to 
develop a different regulated pathway as to 
sperm and egg-editing. The path chosen will 
impact the science, ethics, and financing of 
genome editing for decades to come.
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the next step will depend on the bio-
ethical distinctions drawn above. For 
those who believe that editing sperm 
and eggs is just as problematic as 
embryos, they should seek to alter the 
rider to make it apply to sperm and 
egg-editing as well. For those who 
think that there are important differ-
ences, this may open an opportunity 
to develop a different regulated path-
way as to sperm and egg-editing. The 
path chosen will impact the science, 
ethics, and financing of genome edit-
ing for decades to come.
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